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ABSTRACT
Goal Interdependencies and Opportunism for Supply Chain Partnerships
in China
by
Wu Lanjun
Master of Philosophy

The possibility of opportunistic behavior is an important barrier to the collaboration
between partners in the supply chain as partners pursue their self-interests with guile.
Opportunistic behavior threatens the partners’ relationships, influences their work
accomplishment and prevents future collaboration. This study hypothesizes that
opportunism is not just the result of people’s self-interests pursuit but depends on
how they think their self-interests are related. Opportunism in organizational
partnerships could be understood in terms of how partners perceive their goals are
related to each other. When partners believe that their goals are competitively or
dependently rather than cooperatively related, they are more likely to pursue their
self-interests opportunistically.
Altogether 86 face-to-face interviews were carried out in Beijing, Nanchang and
Guangzhou, China to explore the links and relations among goal interdependencies,
opportunism and the outcomes. Participants who work in a supply chain partnership
were asked to describe an incident regarding their collaboration with their partners. It
included the people involved, the reasons, what occurred, and the consequences.
Structural equation modeling explored the proposed model that goal
interdependencies could affect the levels of opportunism and thus influence the
partnerships. Results suggest that cooperative goals are important foundations for
effective organizational partnerships.
Keywords: Supply chain partnerships, goal interdependence, opportunism
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION
Companies increasingly emphasize specialized skills in the supply chain and they
collaborate with their partners with complementary skills for the mutual benefit.
Both scholars and managers have recognized the increasing importance of
collaboration in supply chain. Fierce competing market and technology
specialization make it critical that companies build an efficient partnership with their
partners. We witness that organizations that develop effective partnerships with their
partners can better meet their customers’ needs and outperform others and survive.
Managers are now increasingly encouraging collaborative activities across
organization borders in the supply chain (Spekman et al., 1998; Womack et al., 1990;
Myhr & Spekman, 2002).

Effective partnerships are based on more than just transactions and work completion.
Collaboration between partners becomes an overall and comprehensive idea in the
supply chain. For instance, customers will continue asking for the high quality
product from suppliers, but they also want to feel confident that their technology
partners are reliable and trustworthy, as well as will be collaborate with them in the
long term (Michael, 2003). Transparency and confidentiality are also critical in the
supply chain partnership now (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Love & Gunasekaran, 1999). As
suppliers and customers want to believe that they are under little risk in disclosing
important information and technologies. This study identifies four important criteria,
namely relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and
innovation to measure the efficiency and quality of partners’ partnerships in supply
chain.

The opportunistic behavior between partners is an important barrier to their
1

partnership because it involves partners’ self-interests with guile (Williamson, 1985,
1991). However, although partners would view opportunism as unethical, it does
occur in relations among organizations in supply chain (Ghoshal & Morgan, 1996;
Griesinger, 1990; Johanson & Mattsson, 1987; Maitland, Bryson, & Van de Ven,
1985; Moschandreass, 1997). Moreover, fearing that their partner would notice that
and feel unfair and exploited, they may engage in those activities that can mask their
opportunism (Wathne & Heide, 2000; Williamson, 1985, 1991).

Thus, it is important to study the conditions that would possibly facilitate or inhibit
opportunism. In order to identify the conditions that impact opportunism, we used
goal interdependence theory to investigate the relationship between how partners
understand their goals to be related to each other and the level of opportunistic
behaviors. Our hypothesis is that what’s critical is not whether partners are highly
self-interested or not but how partners understand their self-interests to be related to
each other. The next sections discuss the paper’s objectives and contributions.

Significance of this Study
Objective of this Study
This research aims to study partnerships between partners within the supply chain.
Specifically it has two aims: First, it explores the effects of opportunism on
partnerships. Specifically, we study how the opportunism affects relationship
enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and innovation in the supply
chain. Second, it uses the theory of cooperation and competition to understand and
predict people’s opportunistic behaviors.

Contributions of this Study
2

This study makes several contributions to the literature. In addition to testing the
generalization of the theory of cooperation and competition and the theory of
opportunism, to supporting those theories with both qualitative and quantitative data,
this study investigates the conditions for opportunistic behaviors and tests the
opportunistic behaviors’ effects on the efficiency of the partnership.

This study applies the theory of cooperation and competition to study the conditions
for opportunism and tests the generalization of the theory of cooperation and
competition; few studies have tried to examine opportunism behavior between
partners with the antecedents of the goals interdependencies. This study demonstrates
the important role of goal interdependencies in understanding people’s opportunistic
behavior. Cooperative goals are hypothesized to contribute to low level of
opportunism and then lead to constructive outcomes. In contrast, competitive and
independent goals are expected to lead to a high level of opportunism and thus harm
the partnerships. Contrary to the transactional cost theory that regards the pursuit of
self-interest as the reason for opportunism, this study proposed that opportunism in
organizational partnerships should not be simply understood as an outcome of
self-interests, but should be understood in terms of how partners understand their
self-interests are related to each other. Those hypotheses, if tested, can provide an
important understanding towards conditions for opportunistic behaviors.

Secondly, this study links the literatures on goal interdependencies, opportunism, and
four outcomes for the partnerships. The study tests the effects of cooperative goal on
the level of opportunism which then influences the partnerships. With positively
related goals, partners can improve their relationships and work productivity, and
raise the possibility of future collaboration and innovation, through the mediator of
opportunism.

Thirdly, this study can also contribute to the literature on goal interdependence and
3

opportunism study by directly examining the interactions between the Chinese
partners. As the theory and scales for goal interdependence and opportunism are
developed from the west, it tests the generality and consistency for those theories in
doing study in China. Finally, it uses both quantitative and qualitative data to test the
hypothesis and theories and provides cases reported by partners with conditions of
different goal interdependencies.

4

Chapter II

LITERATURE REVIEW
After the introduction part of this study about the background and objectives in the
first chapter, this chapter reviews the studies on opportunism and supply chain
partnerships. First, definition and concept on opportunism will be discussed to
understand the idea. Then this study examines how the opportunistic behavior affects
the partnership in supply chain and different approaches of people’s opportunistic
behavior in different cultures, especially in collectivistic culture of China. This will
be followed by the introduction of the theory of cooperation and competition, which
is the theoretical framework of this study. Finally, the chapter summarizes the
literature review and proposes the hypotheses.

Understanding Opportunism
Opportunism in this paper is defined as the behavior by economic agents that
involves “Self-interest-seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985, 1991). Williamson
emphasized that in relations among organizations, such behaviors like fierce
bargaining or strong disagreement are not opportunistic, nor are the advantages that
are resulted from having a unique skill or location. Activities like taking shortcuts,
masking poor quality work, breaking promises and being dishonest in order to get
benefit are common examples of opportunistic behavior. However, although most
people would view opportunism as unethical, it does occur in relations among
organizations. Any organizations can engage in opportunistic behavior, regardless of
their position and relation with others.

Opportunism in the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
In modern theories of economic behaviors, information problems are becoming very
5

important (like search costs, asymmetric information, etc.), combined with
temptations of opportunism (Charles, 1990). These educe the transaction costs and
raise important and interesting issues of organizations. Over the last two decades,
transaction cost theory has become prominent in the academic researches and one of
the most influential statements about this theory is made by Williamson (1975, 1985).
Based on Williamson’s work, researchers have used the transaction costs to explain a
wide range of economic phenomena of organizations including opportunism. In a
word, transaction cost theory has become quite influential in determining our
thinking.

One of the central assumptions of this theory is that the risk of opportunism is
inherent in the relationship among organizations in any transaction. Opportunism is
defined as “self-interest seeking with guile”. This includes not only the apparent
behaviors like lying, stealing and cheating, but also refers to the offering of
incomplete or distorted information with the purpose to misleading, confusing or
blinding others for one’s own benefit.( Williamson, 1985). The costs of negotiating,
monitoring, and controlling to ensure against these possible behaviors in a
transaction are called transaction costs. Williamson (1985) argued that among the
three alternative governance structures, namely ‘market’, 'hierarchy' and 'between
market and hierarchy’, only the optimal one will survive, which minimizes the sum
of production, transaction and organization costs under current conditions of
technology and institutions. If the transaction costs of undertaking an exchange
through the market are greater than the costs of exchanging within a hierarchy, it is
more efficient to conduct the exchange within a hierarchy according to transaction
cost theory (Jones & Hill, 1988; Williamson, 1985). Opportunism is a crucial factor
in this choice. Without it, partners will always keep their promises and act according
to the contract thus minimize the transaction costs (Williamson, 1985).

However, this theory has its own limitation. Research suggests that the formal
6

contract often play a limited role in the relationship between organizations
(Macaulay 1963). Even if a contract exists, often many informal agreements or social
norms affect the relationship (Hart & Moore 1999; Heide & John 1992; Wilson
1980). For example, rail freight relationships are often governed by those unwritten
rules for the volume and equipment they use (Palay, 1984). People will reflect on
their behaviors in a transaction and it may be from their comparison with others, in
the social roles, and in identification with others as models (Argyle, 1994). All of
these are examples of so-called relational contracts or social contracts (Macneil 1978)
and several authors explicitly discuss opportunism within the context of such
contracts (Gibbons 1999; Williamson 1996).

Opportunism in the Social Relation
There is a much wider context other than the contract that can influence the risk of
opportunism which transaction cost theory neglects to consider. Other contexts may
include such as the social network which economic transactions is in and the
invisible hand of many market mechanisms. In another words, the social relation is
the network of partnership between organizations and organizations that are
dependent on each other.

Within transaction cost theory, opportunism is viewed as the violation of an explicit
contract, more resent studies argue that opportunism also includes violation of
relational contracts (Gibbons 1999; Williamson 1996). This has been specified by
Granovetter (1995), who argued that the social context which transactions are in has
a great impact on the behavior of the organizations.

Trust Theory and Opportunism
As we know, the social relation between two parties exists when each party decides
7

his or her behavior totally or in part according to the behaviors of the other with his
or her expectations. Organizations are under behavioral risk when they are uncertain
about the behavior of the partner when the behavior may materially affect them.
Trust is a meaningful concept for the parties to a social relation if and only if at least
one party is exposed to an element of behavioral risk.

In the literature on trust (Gambetta 1988), this notion is described as the one’s
subjective probability that one’s partner will do no harm. The following is the
definition of trust by Nooteboom, 1996: ‘The subjective probability is that the
partner will not utilize opportunities for opportunism, even though it would be to his
material (or economic) benefit.’

Trust is always believed to be a more favorable opinion of human nature and
sometimes it is regarded to have opposing meaning to opportunism. Hill (1990)
furthered the costs theory that when trust prevails, it could serve to eliminate the risk
of opportunism. Trust could economize on the cost of transactions. Efficient
exchange relations are realized when the different parties trust each other. The
presence of trust can benefit a partner relation by reducing the costs of specification,
monitoring and guarding against opportunistic behaviors, encouraging better
business decisions, and ensuring rapid and efficient responses to unforeseen events
and realizing relational contracts. Trust is one of the reasons why transaction is often
governed by many unwritten contracts and verbal promises, rather than the strictly
written legal forms. Partha Dasgupta (1998) argued that trust is central to all
transactions and yet economists rarely discuss this notion.

However, many sociologists and economics have begun to treat trust as self-interest
calculativeness (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Dore, 1983; Coleman, 1990; Williamson,
1993). According to James Coleman, trust only occurs when the expected gain from
being at the risk of trust is positive. James Coleman (1990) pointed out that:
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“Situations involving trust constitute a subclass those involving risk. They are
situations in which the risk one takes depends on the performance of another actor.”
According to Williamson, trust is just calculative self-interest on a higher level.
Completely non-calculative trust occurs only in 'personal trust', such as in the
relationships with friends, family or other loved ones.

Ethics is part of culture issue which can provide a basis for trust within a partnership.
But it doesn’t imply a complete eliminate of calculativeness. People may still be
tempted by opportunism if the reward is high enough and it is called ‘golden
opportunity'. That is why trust, based on ethics or personal bonds, cannot totally
eliminate the risk of opportunism.

Reputation Mechanism and Opportunism
The reputation mechanism is well known as an implement that can limit
opportunistic behavior, but it is also known that its operation is limited to the
conditions of monitoring, so that it may not be perfect. Only on the basis of
reputation mechanism, opportunism remains in the relationship between
organizations if self-interest is the only force of behavior (Nooteboom, 1996).

The reason is that monitoring of opportunism is never perfect and costless. When we
assume that there is an automatic and costless reputation mechanism, controlling or
monitoring still require costs and opportunism remains if the potential reward is less
than the penalty of opportunism

This study uses the definition of opportunism by Williams and traditional operations
of the concept. However, this definition includes a broad range of potentially
different behaviors. If the concept of opportunism itself is poorly understood,
documenting its potential outcomes is problematic. This section further reviews and
9

discusses current theoretical perspectives on opportunism to describe opportunism
more specifically.

In the original transaction cost literature, opportunism is defined in general terms as
“self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975). This distinguishes
opportunism from the standard self-interest–seeking behavior by including the notion
of guile. In subsequent work, Williamson (1985) describes ‘guile’ as “lying, stealing,
cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise
confuse.” In these practical terms, the characterization of opportunism indicates that
human beings are only “weakly moral” (Douglas, 1990) and cannot be counted to
abide by contracts or fixed rules of interaction with each other (John, 1984;
Williamson, 1993).

Indeed, studies have suggested that formal contracts typically play a relatively
limited role in understanding opportunism (Macaulay 1963). Consequently,
researchers have examined opportunism in social relations generally. Specifically,
transaction cost theory has extended the original concept of opportunism to the
domain of relational contracts (Muris, 1981; Williamson, 1979, 1985, 1991). But the
precise meaning of the opportunism concept itself in relational contracts has not been
stated clearly.

Macneil (1981) suggests that it is necessary to begin with the definition of the term
“guile”, which he defines as “taking advantage of opportunities with little regard for
principles or consequences.” However, this definition requires “principles and
consequences” to be defined. Researchers have different perspectives about this:
Economists often emphasize consequences and outcomes whereas legal scholars
emphasize principles. This study focuses on violations of principles. Opportunism is
regarded as the behavior that violates operative principles and norms with the
intention is to gain more benefits for the self.
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For example, some researchers have argued that taking advantage of a lock-in
condition may violate a principle itself, namely, the exploitation of another party’s
vulnerability (Barney, 1996; Sabel, 1993). Conceptually, a lock-in situation transfers
the collaboration between two parties from a pattern of unconstrained bargaining or
exchange (Graham & Peirce 1989) into a command business (Macaulay, 1985), in
which one party lacks the ability to retaliate. In our opinion, although exploiting
vulnerability may be inconsistent with some general ethical norms, taking advantage
of a lock-in situation would not be considered as opportunistic unless it violated an
existing rule operating in that relationships. According to Macneil (1981), identifying
a behavior of opportunistic requires an assessment of whether it was “contrary to the
principles of the relation in which it occurs.” Otherwise, a given behavior, even if it
takes place under conditions of unequal bargaining power, only represents
conventional self-interest seeking.

Therefore, in this paper, opportunism is considered to involve those behaviors of
cheating and slacking related to an implicit or explicit contract, with the intention of
seeking one’s own interest. For example, the traditional moral hazard problem
describes how the information asymmetry enables one organization to supply lower
level of quality or output of the products than that was contracted for. In this case,
the organization utilizes information asymmetry to conduct some behaviors that are
against the contract with its partner in their collaboration, with the intention to obtain
more benefits for itself and thus is opportunistic as defined here.

According to previous studies, opportunistic behavior is reduced by self-interest or at
least self calculativeness and it is hard to avoid. However, people with different
culture backgrounds may have different attitudes and thinking towards opportunism.
The next section continues to discuss opportunistic behavior under different cultures,
especially in China where the data for this study were collected.
11

Opportunism and Culture Differences
Based on the above analysis, opportunistic behavior is induced by people’s
self-interest seeking. People’s diverse self-values and their beliefs of their
interdependence with others that influences their attitudes and approaches towards
opportunism behavior in their partnership can help us understand opportunistic
behavior in different cultures

Diverse Self-values in Different Cultures
Anthropological and psychological studies provide support for the idea that self
concept varies across cultures. Smith & Bond (1998) emphasized the “distinction
between the independent conception of the self fostered by individualistic culture and
the interdependent conception of the self fostered by collectivist culture”. For
example, Kitayama (1991), Roland (1988) and Shweder & Bourne (1984) found that
people in the United States had extremely different view of the self, others, and the
interdependence of the two than people in India and Japan.

Individualistic culture promotes a view of the self which is individualized,
independent and autonomous, and comprises a unique combination of inner attributes.
By contrast, collectivist culture emphasizes the relations of individuals with each
other which the common sense of self is familial and highly relational in the society.
Behavior is oriented from harmonious interdependence with others rather than the
expression of individuality and self achievement (Ash, 2000).

Values on Opportunistic Behavior in Collectivistic Culture
Based on the above discussion, Collectivistic people may often avoid opportunism
because they value interpersonal relationship highly and avoid the possible behavior
that may damage the relationship (Ding, 1995; Jehn & Weldon, 1992; Kirkbride,
12

Tang, & Westwood, 1991; Leung, 1997; Triandis, 1989; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui,
1990; Tse, Francis, & Walls, 1994). For example, a number of authors have argued
that in Japan, organizations economize on governance, enable less opportunistic
behavior and build fruitful relations, on the basis of more trustful, long term relations
(Dore, 1989; Cusumano & Fijimoto, 1991; Helper, 1991; Dyer & Ouchi, 1993). Also,
‘relational bonds’ are thought critical for doing business in China and Chinese people
are regarded as less likely to be opportunistic (Hwang, 1987, 1997–1998, 2000; Lee,
Pae, & Wong, 2001).

However, this strong relational bond can not ensure a low level of opportunism in
collectivistic cultures. First, organizations in Collectivistic Culture can just be
calculative in that they understand the value to maintain the social relation. Once the
potential benefit is more than the penalty of guilt, they may be tempted to be
opportunistic (Nooteboom, 1996). Second, Collectivistic people may conclude that
their partners are out-group member and once they think so, they are likely to exploit
them (Chen et al., 2002). As a result, opportunism is a likely barrier to partnerships
in Asia as well as in the West. It is interesting and valuable to study opportunistic
behavior in China.

Supply Chain Partnership and Opportunism
Although people with various cultures and backgrounds may have different levels of
likelihood of opportunism, opportunism is found to be prevalent in partnerships
between organizations. It can be an important barrier to collaboration between
partners in a supply chain partnership.

Supply Chain Partnership
Successful partnerships are based more on just transactions and work completion.
Collaboration between partners becomes an overall and comprehensive idea in the
13

supply chain. For example, partners want to feel confident that the other party is
reliable and trustworthy, as well as will collaborate with them in the long term (Dell,
2003). Also, transparency and confidentiality are critical in the supply chain
partnership (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Love & Gunasekaran, 1999). As suppliers and
customers want to believe that they are under little risk to disclose important
information and technologies to each other.

Developing innovation creates competitive advantage in organizations. It helps them
respond to the changes quicker and solve problems better. Innovation has been
proved to help groups and organizations accomplish objectives easier and more
effective (Williams, 2006). Through making constant innovation in its supply chain,
a company can better achieve customer satisfaction by responding to customers’
needs promptly.

Innovation could involve a large number of changes to an organization’s activities
that lead to the improvement of its performance. These changes can be improved
products and processes, investments in new machines and trainings and the creations
of intellectual properties (Rogers, 1998). Researchers have shown a strong
relationship between market performance and innovation (Thomas, 1993). Both
supplier and customers are now facing fierce competition in this dynamic market, so
they must learn how to innovate so as to compete with many other competitors on
responding to buyers’ need rapidly, improving buyers’ satisfaction and adapting to
the changing marketplace. As a source of knowledge and information, it is critical
that the companies in supply chain can help each other innovate successfully.

Based on the previous ideas, we identified four important criteria in this study,
namely relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and
innovation to measure the efficiency and

quality of partners’ partnerships in supply
14

chain.

Opportunism in Current Supply Chain Partnership
Economic activity may be more efficient when it is conducted within a single
organization, or hierarchy, rather than through a market of several organizations.
Opportunism is an important reason in this (Williamson, 1975; Williamson & Ouchi,
1981). The possibility of opportunism emergency is much less in hierarchical
relationships within an organization than it is in the relations among organizations as
among organizations as there is no formal hierarchy to monitor people’s behavior
(Parkhe, 1993). Also, the incidence of opportunism will be low when relationships
among organizations are long-term rather than short-term. Thus, opportunistic
behavior has become particularly critical as organizations are relying more and more
on supply chain partnership to do business and are moving away from the short-term
pattern of the traditional supply chain to build a long-term partnership to better
respond to the competing and rapidly changing marketplace (Buvik & Gronhaug,
2000).

Partnerships and Opportunism
The possibility of opportunistic behavior is an important barrier to the partnership
between organizations (Williamson, 1985, 1991). Concern about partner’s
opportunism is quite strong and thinking one’s partner is opportunistic is quite
harmful to many important aspects of the partnership in the supply chain (Friman,
Garling, Millett, Mattsson, & Johnston, 2002; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998).

Firstly, the idea that one’s partner has potential opportunistic behavior is harmful for
the relationship and long term collaboration itself between partners. When
opportunism occurs, partners become suspicious of each other and regard each other
15

as untrustworthy and unreliable. It damages the partners’ relationship and it is hard
for them to build a trusting and long term relationship again. On the contrary, a low
level of opportunism enables more trustful and long term collaborations between
partners (Nooteboom, 1996).

Secondly, opportunistic behavior makes people distrust each other, inhibiting
openness (Sabel 1993), which decreases the efficiency and productivity of the
relationship (Bradach & Eccles 1989, Dyer & Chu 2003, Zaheer & Venkatraman
1995). Moreover, opportunism increases the need for monitoring and increases
transaction costs thus lowering productivity (Anderson & Narus 1990, Bradach &
Eccles 1989, Nooteboom, 1996).

Thirdly, the process of innovation requires a combination of products, markets,
information and technologies that most companies do not have. Companies have
realized that their suppliers and customers may have the knowledge and information
they lack which can be helpful for them to improve product and service quality and
meet customer needs. By building a good partnership with low risk of opportunistic
behaviors, organizations in supply chain can share their knowledge and information
more openly and fully, so that they are more knowledgeable and resourceful;
organizations in supply chain can also help each other gain more insight to buyers’
need so that they can improve product or service according to buyers’ needs. As a
result, organizations can continuously innovate to strengthen their market
competitive advantage (Ansari & Modarress, 1990; Child & Yan, 2003; Frey &
Schlosser, 1993; Hardy, Phillips & Lawrence, 2003; Ireland, Hitt & Vaidyanath,
2003). In this way, in a positive supply chain partnership with low risk of
opportunistic behavior, supply chain could act as an important source for innovation.
However, this kind of openness and sharing of information is hard to achieve in the
partnership with high level of opportunism. Opportunism decreases the possibility of
innovation in a supply chain partnership.
16

Based on the previous discussion above, this study proposes that opportunism leads
to bad outcomes in the partnership in the supply chain. Specifically, we propose that
partner opportunism affects four important outcomes, namely relationship
enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and innovation. Specifically,
the first four hypotheses are developed as:

H1: Opportunism reduces partners’ relationship enhancement in the supply chain.
H2: Opportunism reduces partners’ work productivity in the supply chain.
H3: Opportunism reduces partners’ future collaboration in the supply chain.
H4: Opportunism reduces partners’ innovation in the supply chain.

To summarize, opportunism is prevalent in the partnership between organizations
and it damages the supply chain partnership in many aspects. Recent literature on the
inter-organizational relationship has focused on strategies to control and manage
opportunism. Surprisingly, little attention has focused on what reduces opportunism
itself. We need to understand the conditions that affect the extent to which
organizations are likely to engage in opportunism behavior in the relations with their
partners in supply chain. The next section introduces the cooperation and
competition theory to help us understand when opportunism is less likely.

Goal Interdependence Theory and Opportunism
As define by Williamson (1985, 1991), opportunism is the behavior that involves
“Self-interest-seeking with guile”. Previous research about opportunism tend to
argue that partners should be less focused on their self-interest zealously and more on
their common benefit and their relationship. In the transaction cost theory,
self-interest pursuit is regarded as harmful and results in opportunism (Provan &
Skinner, 1989). In the relation transaction theory, trust, ethics or people’s relation
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may lead to low level of opportunism but they could all be treated as calculative
self-interests. In this sense, completely non-self-interest and trust do not exist in the
partnership between organizations (Williamson, 1991).

However, the pursuit of self-interest is basic to human nature and it is hard to
eliminate. Alfred, Tjosvold & Zi-you (2005) pointed out that what is critical is not
the extent to which organizations are self-interested or whether they pursue their
self-interest, but how they believe their self-interests are related to each other. When
people confirm that their interests are positively related to their partners, they
develop a relationship that leads to low levels of opportunism. This study uses
Deutsch’s (1973) theory of cooperation and competition to explain and develop this
idea.

Introduction of Goal Interdependence Theory
Deutsch (1973) proposed that it is how people perceived their goals are related that
affects and determines the interactions between individuals, groups and organizations.
The premise of the theory of cooperation and competition is that the way goals are
related determines how the individuals, groups, and organizations interact and these
interaction patterns in turn affects outcomes (Deutsch, 1949, 1973; Johnson &
Johnson, 1989). The way people think their goals related to others affects their
interaction so that people may promote the success of others, obstruct the success of
others, or pursue their goals regardless of the success or failure of others. Deutsch
identified these three kinds of alternatives as cooperation, competition, and
independence.

Researchers have already shown the effects of goal interdependence between
individuals and groups and in some inter-organizational interaction (Cook, 1984;
Tjosvold, 1988; Wong, Tjosvold & Yu, 2005). This study helps to test that this
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theory can also apply to understand the relationship between supply chain
organizations.

Cooperation, Competition, and Independence
In cooperation, people perceive their goals are positively related so that they think if
they reach their goals, others can reach their goals as well. One will success if and
only if others success. They understand one’s goal achievement helps others reach
their goals. So people in cooperative situation want each other to work for their goals
effectively, because the other’s effectiveness is necessary to help all of them reach
their goals.

In contrast to cooperation, people in competitive situation believe that their goals are
negatively correlated, that is, if one person attain one’s goal, all the others may fail or
less likely to attain their goals. This is called a ‘win-lose’ situation. People believe
that they can perform better when others perform ineffectively. When others are
effective, they are less likely to succeed themselves. Competitive goal
interdependence makes people want to beat others and prove they are the best and
they are frustrated when others work effectively and successfully. They fight against
each other to win.

Independence goals occur when people believe their goals are unrelated. One’s goal
attainment has no influence on the goal attainment of others. So the success by one
neither make others fail nor succeed. In such condition, people believe that whether
others act effectively or not, success or not means little to them.

The relationship of their goals has important effects on expectations, interaction and
outcomes. In cooperation, people know that other’s success could help them, so that
they want others to work hard and effectively for their mutual benefit. (Lewicki,
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McAllister & Bies, 1998). On the contrary, people in competition expect others to
work ineffectively and fail and they may even try to hander other’s work for their
own benefits. (Deutsch, 1973; Johnson et al., 1981; Stanne et al., 1999). They just
want to win others in the competition. With independent goals, people tend to do
their work regardless of others. They have no interest in helping or harming others
and become indifferent to the performance of others.

Goal Independences and Opportunism
Cooperation and competition theory suggests that opportunistic behavior is much
more likely to happen when partners believe their goals are competitive and
independent related than partners with cooperative goals. In cooperation, people
consider their goal achievements and interests are positively related. They help each
other to work effectively for their mutual interests and this in turn maximize their
self-interests thus the potential opportunistic behavior reduces.

However, with competitive goals, the failing of other’s reaching their goals can
facilitate their own goal reaching. They may even be tempted to obstruct the goal
progress of others and behave opportunistically. So as long as they view their
interests as negatively related with their partners, they may engage in opportunistic
behavior can help them seek their own interests by means of obstructing others
reaching their goals. With independent goals, people expect that others will work for
their own goals with little regard for the goals of others. Generally, independent
goals have been found to have similar effects on the interaction of people as
competition, although not as strong (Deutsch, 1973; Johnson et al., 1981). Both
competition and independent goals can encourage people’s opportunistic behavior.

Opportunism is not just the result of pursuit self-interests but of how self-interests
and goals are related; goal interdependencies are critical factors that influence
20

opportunistic behavior in partnerships in supply chain. Based on the above
discussion, the hypotheses are:

H5a: Partners with cooperative goals in a supply chain engage in a low level of
opportunism.
H5b: Partners with competitive goals in a supply chain engage in a high level of
opportunism.
H5c: Partners with independent goals in a supply chain engage in a high level of
opportunism.

Why do we use opportunism as the mediator between goal interdependence and
outcomes? Collaboration is superior to individual action in achieving many goals,
from moving very heavy things to operating a complex organization. However, given
that people have inconsistent (or at least only partially consistent) goals with each
other, how can the collaboration be achieved and maintained? This is also the case
for the collaboration between organizations. In Williamson's view, parties
collaborate or abstain from collaborating based entirely on the calculation of the
expected self-benefits. And if they cannot achieve what they want by collaborating
with others, they may well engage in opportunism in search for larger benefits. In
addition, if they do not believe each other can be restrained by contracts or norms,
the parties must control and monitor to protect themselves from opportunistic
behaviors.

What are the most efficient means for ensuring against the possible hazards of
opportunism? Perceived cooperatively related goals and benefits between
organizations could be an effective means. As discussed before, with cooperative
goals, organizations consider their goal achievements and interests are positively
related. They tend to help each other to work effectively for their mutual interests
and at the same time maximize their self-interests, thus reducing the potential of
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opportunistic behaviors. In contrast, with competitive goals, the failing of other’s
goals attainment facilitates their own goal reaching. They may even be tempted to
obstruct the goal progress of others and behave opportunistically. Independent goals
have generally been found to have similar effects as competition, although not as
strong. All in all, how organizations believe their goals are related may very much
affect the level of opportunism.

Therefore, this study uses goal interdependence as an important variable to explain
organization’s possible behavior of opportunism. Goal interdependence is
hypothesized to affect partnerships through the mediator of opportunism. The
hypothesized model is also consistent with the basic proposition of goal
interdependence theory in that how people believe their goals are related is
hypothesized to affect the dynamics of their interaction and these dynamics in turn
affect outcomes.

Summary
Opportunism is prevalent in the partnerships between organizations in the supply
chain and is defined as partners’ pursue of self-interest with guile (Williamson, 1985,
1991). Studies already demonstrated the harmfulness of opportunism to supply chain
partnerships in many organization issues (Friman, Garling, Millett, Mattsson, &
Johnston, 2002; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). These include deterioration of
relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and innovation
ability and so on. Researchers have recognized it is necessary to identify the
conditions under which opportunism occurs and partners become suspicious of each
other (Chen, Peng, & Saparito, 2002; Maitland et al., 1985).

Both transaction costs theory and social theory argue that it is people’s pursuit of
self-interest that leads to opportunism. Theories point out that opportunism is
inevitable due to the human nature of

self-interest, despite taking into
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consideration of many social issues like trusting, ethics and reputation mechanism.
However, this kind of concept ignores the situation when people share the common
goals and believe their self-interests are positively related but are still jealously
self-interested. Therefore this study adopts the concept that this pursuit of
self-interest itself is not harmful for the partnership and it does not lead directly to
opportunism. The critical issue is how they believe their self-interests are related to
each other. When self-interests are considered positively related, partners have low
levels of opportunism and build effective partnerships (Alper, Tjosvold & Law,
2000).

Thus self-interest is not always destructive; it is how people consider and conduct
their self-interest that largely determines the outcomes. Goal interdependence theory
is therefore very useful in this study to understand people’s opportunistic behaviors.
It indicates that people’s perceptions of their goal interdependencies influence their
interactions with each other in managing their self-interest, and finally lead to
different outcomes regarding opportunism (Deutsch, 1973). Based on this theory,
three kinds of goals interdependencies, namely cooperative, competitive and
independent goals are identified to characterize people’s attitude toward opportunism.
In cooperative situations, people construed their goals as positively related and one’s
goal achievement helps others also achieve their interests. Therefore they help each
other to seek mutual self-interests and thus reduce opportunistic behavior. In a
competitive condition, members believe their goals are negatively related; one’s
success makes others less likely to be successful. Consequently, people treat their
self-interests as incompatible, thus they try to earn their own benefits at the expense
of others and it encourages opportunism. Independent situation shares the same
outcomes as competitive ones.

Though developed in the west, goal interdependence theory has also been shown to
be effective in the Asian countries, like China. Opportunism cannot simply be
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understood as the result of self-interest. Having cooperative goals is regarded to be a
constructive approach toward self-interest seeking in supply chain partnership, which
can generate more positive outcomes compared with competitive and independent
goals.
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CHAPTER III
HYPOTHESES
After a review on the previous studies on opportunism in Chapter II, this chapter
displays all the hypotheses that have been developed based on the literature review. It
first presents the hypothesized model and then explains the variable and the study’s
six hypotheses.

Hypothesized Model
Figure 1 Hypothesized Structural Model in this Study

Relationship
Enhancement

Cooperative
Goal

Work
Competitive

Opportunism

Productivity

Goal
Future
Collaboration

Independent
Goal

Innovation

As shown in the figure above, the basic model to be tested in this study is that
perceived goal interdependence affects opportunistic behavior and then leads to four
outcomes. In this model, cooperative, competitive and independent goals are
identified as antecedents to affect the outcomes of relationship enhancement, work
productivity, future collaboration and innovation. Seven hypotheses are listed below:
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H1: Opportunism reduces partners’ relationship enhancement in the supply chain.
H2: Opportunism reduces partners’ work productivity in the supply chain.
H3: Opportunism reduces partners’ future collaboration in the supply chain.
H4: Opportunism reduces partners’ innovation in the supply chain.
H5a: Partners with cooperative goals in a supply chain engage in a low level of
opportunism.
H5b: Partners with competitive goals in a supply chain engage in a high level of
opportunism.
H5c: Partners with independent goals in a supply chain engage in a high level of
opportunism.

Model Variables
This study proposes that people’s perception of their goal relationships with their
partners affect their actions toward opportunism that influences the supply chain
partnership in many aspects. There are seven variables in the hypothesized model
with three antecedent variables, two mediators and four outcomes. All the variables
are measured in 7 point Likert-scales.

This section defines each variable in the model (Figure 1):
Cooperative goals are measured by the extent the interviewees think their
goals and their partners’ are positively related.
Competitive goals are measured by the extent the interviewees think their
goals and their partners’ are negatively related.
Independent goal is measured by the extent the interviewees think their goals
and their partners’ are unrelated.
Opportunism is measured by the extent to which the one’s partner was
perceived to be willing to pursue its own interests with guile.
Relationship Enhancement is measured by the effect of the interaction
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between the partners on their feelings and attitudes toward each other.
Work Productivity is measured by the effect of the interaction between the
partners on their task accomplishment of their collaboration.
Future Collaboration is measured by the effect of the interaction between the
partners on the likelihood of their future effective collaboration.
Innovation is measured by the effect of the interaction between the partners
on their improved ability to develop new and useful ideas and products.
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CHAPTER IV
METHOD
This research studies opportunism in supply chain relationships between suppliers
and customers in China. I used an interview-based study to collect the data to test the
hypothesis. In half a year, I interviewed 86 people in mainland China for the sample
of this study.

Participants
Eighty-eight employees were involved in this study and two of them felt it hard to
understand some of the questions and did not provide all the answers, so their
answers are not included. Of the 86 participants, 34 are the suppliers and 52 are the
customers. Of all the respondents, 50 are male and 36 are female and the average age
is 36. 72 of them said the supply chain relationship they talked about existed for
more than 1 year. 63 of them have bachelor degree and 7 of them have higher degree.

Of the 34 suppliers (See Table 1), 59% were male, 85% of the supply chain
relationships they talked about existed for more than 1 year, 71% had a bachelor
degree and 11% had either a master or a doctorate degree.
Table 1
Number of Participants

Percentage

Male

20

59%

Female

14

41%

5

15%

Gender

The partnership’s existence
< 1 year

28

> 1 year

29

85%

Without Bachelor degree

6

18%

Bachelor degree

24

71%

Graduate degree

4

11%

Educational level

Of the 52 customers (See Table 2), 58% were male, 83% of the supply chain
relationships they talked about existed for more than 1 year, 75% had a bachelor
degree and 6% had either a master or a doctorate degree.
Table 2
Number of Participants

Percentage

Male

30

58%

Female

22

42%

< 1 year

9

17%

> 1 year

43

83%

Without Bachelor degree

10

19%

Bachelor degree

39

75%

Graduate degree

3

6%

Gender

The partnership’s existence

Educational level

I tried to choose the samples that could reflect the diverse business, gender, age and
education level in China. I choose those who are actually working in a supply chain
relationship and who are likely to understand the questions. Consequently, there are
86 satisfactory participators from different business and with different genders, ages
and education levels. While the sample is too small to represent Chinese mainland as a
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whole, these interviews are diverse in studying supply chain relationships.

Interview
Critical Incident Technique (CIT) was used in this study. During the interview, each
interviewee was first asked to describe a concrete example when he/she interacted
with a person(s) from another organization in his/her supply chain and they disagree
with each other or somehow need to negotiate regarding an issue. After that the
interviewee was asked to rate specific questions based on the recalled example on
7-point Likert-type scales. Measures include goal interdependencies, opportunism
and four outcomes of their relationship and work effectiveness.

Critical Incident Technique
The critical incident technique (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954) was used in this study to
develop the interview structure. CIT is considered to be very useful when studying
complex interpersonal phenomenon (Walker & Truly, 1992). This method could help
moderate the errors when persons need to summarize across many incidents to give a
respond in most surveys (Schwartz, 1999).

Interviewees were first asked to describe a recent incident when they disagreed with
a person (s) from another organization in his/her supply chain during their
collaboration or somehow needed to negotiate regarding an issue with that person(s).
They need to recall the reason of this instance, people involved, what happened,
people’s reaction and the outcome. The outcome can be one that they thought was
satisfactory or unsatisfactory. After the describing the instance, they answered
specific questions regarding the instance they described. The scales include goal
interdependencies, opportunistic behavior and four outcomes of their relationship
and work performance. In order to reduce biases, interviewees were not informed of
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the hypotheses in the whole process. Before the interview, they were told their
responses could be kept totally confidential.

Interview Schedule
The interviews were conducted in mainland China during the summer of 2007 and at
Christmas. Each interview lasted for almost one hour and was conducted in
Mandarin. First, I did some pre-tests among colleagues and Chinese friends in Hong
Kong before the summer break. I wanted to make sure the interviews are practical
and the questions are understood. I made some changes according to their feedback
and suggestions. Later, I went to Beijing and Nanchang to collect data during the
summer in 2007. It took one and a half months to do the interviews. After that
summer, I went to Guangzhou to collect data again during the Christmas break. The
interviewees were relatives, friends, formal classmates and those introduced to me by
them.

Scales
Goal Interdependence
Based on Deutsch’s (1949, 1973) cooperation and competition theory, three items in
form of 7-point Likert-scale (from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree) taken
from Alper, Tjosvold & Law (1998) indicated how the interviewees construed their
relationship between their goals and those of the partners in the supply chain
relationship in the incident. The first item “How much would your reaching your
objectives help the other person reach his or her objectives” measured the extent to
which interviewees assumed a cooperative goal relationship with their partners. The
second item “How much would your accomplishing your objectives interfere with his
or her objectives” measured competitive goals between the partners. And the last item
‘In your mind, how related was your reaching your objectives with the other reaching
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his objectives’ measured independent goal relationship and is a reversed item.

Opportunism
An opportunism scale developed in the West was used here (Parkhe, 1993). The six
opportunism items measured the extent to which the partner was perceived to be
willing to pursue its own interests with guile. For example, sometimes our partner
alters the facts slightly in order to get what they need. The scale demonstrated
acceptable reliability. The opportunism scale has a Cronbach alpha reliability of 0.86.

Relationship Enhancement
A three-item scale taken from Tjosvold & Sun (2000) was developed to measure the
extent that the interviewee improved his/her relationship with the partner after the
interaction, i.e. the extent this interaction strengthen the interviewees’ relationship
with the other person in the incident. The relationship scale had a Cronbach alpha of
0.83.

Work Productivity
This scale is to measure the extent that the interviewees’ interaction with others
helped to solve the current problem effectively and efficiently. This 3-item scale has
a Cronbach alpha reliability of 0.7. A sample item is “how efficiently did you and
your partner accomplish the task in this interaction”.

Future Collaboration
A three-item scale was developed to measure the interviewee’s inclination to
collaborate with the partner in the future (Tjosvold, Andrews & Struthers, 1991). For
example, “To what extent do did you want to collaborate with this person in the
future after this instance”. The future collaboration scale had a Cronbach alpha of
0.91.
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Innovation
Interviewees were asked to rate the effect of innovation from the incident using a
four-item scale developed by Burpitt & Bigoness (1997). Example item is “How
much did this interaction help you seek out information about new markets, products,
and technologies from sources outside the organization.” The innovation scale had a
Cronbach alpha of 0.90.

Table 3 Scales and Reliabilities
Measures

Number of Items

Alpha

Opportunism

6

0.86

Relationship Enhancement

3

0.83

Work Productivity

3

0.7

Future collaboration

3

0.91

Innovation

4

0.9

Analysis
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses were used in this study. Regarding the
quantitative data, it is based on the interviewees’ ratings on the scales we developed.
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was first applied to test whether the respondents’
ratings would load on opportunism, relationship enhancement, work productivity,
future collaboration and innovation as five distinct factors. Sample difference was
then analyzed to test whether the hypothesized model differed across the two groups
of respondents: the suppliers and customers, as well as three groups: interviewees
work in Beijing, Nanchang and Guangzhou. Correlation analysis was used to have
initial tests of the relationships among different variables, i.e., how would the three
types of goal interdependence relate to the level of opportunism, and how the
opportunism related to the four outcomes. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was
then used to further study the causal relationships among goal interdependencies,
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opportunism, relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and
innovation.
Regarding the qualitative data from the’ narrative recording of the interviews on the
incidents, I selected specific case studies to understand the conditions that lead to
opportunistic behaviors and the outcomes.

Scale Validation
I carried out a series of confirmatory factor analyses test whether the respondents’
ratings would load on opportunism, relationship enhancement, work productivity,
future collaboration and innovation as five distinct factors. Although most of the
items used in this study have been validated in the previous study, some of the scales
are first developed in the West, the forms and values may be different than those in
China. Also, some of the questions are differently structured. Therefore, it is
necessary to examine if these scales are appropriately organized.

We excluded the three goal relationships items from the confirmatory factor analyses
because each of the three goal interdependent scale has one single item.
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was then performed to validate that the five
scales are distinct variables. The results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4 Validation through Confirmatory Factor Analyses
Models
d.f.

Model χ²

125

281.18

129

combined
combined

Baseline 5-factor Model (M0) keeping opportunism,

NFI

NNFI

CFI

.

.74

.84

.83

310.79

29.61

.72

.81

.80

129

308.85

27.67

.72

.81

.80

130

474.7

193.52

.57

.64

.63

Δχ²

Relationship enhancement, Work Productivity, Future
collaboration and Innovation as distinct factors
4-factor

Model

(M1)

including

a

combined

opportunism and Relationship enhancement factor
4-factor

Model

(M1)

including

a

opportunism and Work Productivity factor
4-factor

Model

(M1)

including

a

opportunism and Future collaboration factor
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4-factor

Model

(M1)

including

a

combined

129

346.63

65.45

.68

.77

.76

a

combined

134

374.86

93.68

.66

.75

.74

135

509.76

228.58

.53

.61

.60

opportunism and Innovation factor
2-factor

Model

(M6)

including

Relationship enhancement, Work Productivity, Future
collaboration and Innovation factor
One factor solution (M7)
Notes:
* N of cases =86
* In the one-factor Model (M7), all the factors were combined into one factor.
* NFI Bentler-Bonnett Normed Fit Index; CFI Comparative Fit Index; NNFI Bentler-Bonnett Non-Normed Fit Index.

Table 4 shows the results of these confirmatory factor analyses which indicate a good
fit between our proposed five-scale model and the data. The 5-factor model fits the
data the best with the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Bentler-Bonnett Fit Index
(NFI) as .83 and .74, respectively. This 5-factor model was then compared to four
different 4-scale models. The first comparative model was the 4-factor model, in
which we merged opportunism and relationship enhancement into one aggregate
factor. The second comparative model was the 4-factor model in which we merged
opportunism and work productivity into one aggregate factor. The third comparative
model was the 4-factor model, which we merged opportunism and future
collaboration into one aggregate factor and the fourth one is to merge opportunism
and innovation factors. The 2-factor comparative model included a combined
relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and innovation
factor. And the last comparative model is 1-factor model, which all the factors were
combined into one factor.

Results in Table 4 show that chi-squares of all the comparative models increase
significantly compared with the hypothesized model. The comparative models also
have significantly lower fit indices than the hypothesized model. Therefore, the
comparisons of the models suggest that the 5-factor proposed model is a distinct
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measure of the constructs in our study. However, the CFI score of 0.83 for the
original 5-factor model is not satisfactory given the usually critical value of .90
(Bentler & Bonnett, 1980). A possible reason is that some items for the variables are
cross-loaded on two or more factors (items that had loadings of greater than 0.3 on
more than one factor). After we did the Factor Analysis and deleted some items that
are cross-loaded (item 1, 4, 11 and 13), we re-did the CFA. The CFI score rose to
0.90 without the deleted items, which is regarded as acceptable according to the
critical value. However, to make the items for each variable consistent with the
original measures, we did not delete the cross-loaded items that led to a low CFI.

Hypotheses Test
We first tested whether the differences of groups of respondents had effects on the
results. We divided all the participants into three groups according to their cities and
tested the differences of their responses between interviewees who worked in
different cities in mainland China. We also tested the differences of their responses
between interviewees who were suppliers and customers.

The hypothesized mediating effects model (M0) was first compared to the direct
effects model (M1) (shown in next chapter). The direct effects model implies that goal
interdependence impacts outcomes directly while the mediating effects model
proposes that opportunism mediate between goal interdependence and outcomes.
At the same time, other models except the direct effects model may fit the data
equally well. So we also compare the hypothesized model to the second alternative
model (M2) that opportunism is the antecedent of goal interdependencies which then
impact the outcomes.

Summary
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Eighty-six Chinese employees who worked in a supply chain relationship were
interviewed in Beijing, Nanchang and Guangzhou, during the period from June 2007
to December 2007. We used critical incident technique to develop the interview.
Interviewees were first asked to describe an incident when they disagreed or needed
to negotiate with their partners. They then answered specific questions based on the
recalled incidents. Scales included goal interdependencies, opportunistic behavior
and the four outcomes of relationship enhancement, work productivity, future
collaboration and innovation.

Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected and analyzed. CFA results
validated the five distinct scales. Correlational analysis was used to do the initial test
of the relationship among variables in the hypothesized model. Structural equation
modeling (SEM) was then adopted to explore the causal relationships among goal
interdependencies, opportunism and the outcomes. Some specific cases were selected
to understand the conditions that lead to opportunistic behaviors and the outcomes.

37

CHAPTER V

RESULTS
Chapter four described the methods used to analyze the quantitative and qualitative
data. This chapter reports how we analyze the data collected from the interviews and
presents the results of data analyses. Specifically, it describes the sample and
regional difference analysis, correlational analysis, structural equation modeling
analysis, and the results. Lastly, it presents the cases.

Sample Difference Analysis
A first step was to determine whether the interviewees’ respondents to the variables
differed across suppliers and customers.
Table 5 Results of sample difference Analysis
df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

(1) Cooperation

1

10.877

2.933

.090

(2) Competition

1

4.774

1.496

.225

(3) Independence

1

.058

.018

.892

(4) Opportunism

1

.187

.121

.729

(5) Relationship Enhancement

1

1.927

1.114

.294

(6) Work Productivity

1

.112

.120

.730

(7) Future Collaboration

1

1.153

.572

.451

(8) Innovation

1

12.872

9.617

.031

Table 5 shows the results that there are no significant differences in the two groups of
interviewees’ responses towards our variables, which indicates that the suppliers
group and customers group are not significantly different. We combined the two sets
of data into one.
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Regional Difference Analysis
Differences of the recorded variables between interviewees who worked in Beijing,
Nanchang or Guangzhou were also tested. The effects of the interviewees’ working
city were examined to see whether cultural background and working environment
significantly affected interviewees’ responding. Given the reason that the three cities
of China are in different phrases of development and have different cultures and
traditions in doing business in the supply chain, we may assume that the reported
goal interdependencies and opportunistic behaviors may differ across the cities the
interviewees are working on. The results (Table 6) indicate that there are no
significant effects of the regional factor on employees’ ratings. As the results do not
find significant differences, we could use all the samples together.

Table 6 Results of Regional difference Analysis
df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

(1) Cooperation

2

6.370

1.708

.188

(2) Competition

2

10.892

3.601

.032

(3) Independence

2

9.189

3.094

.051

(4) Opportunism

2

2.340

1.554

.217

(5) Relationship Enhancement

2

4.158

2.483

.090

(6) Work Productivity

2

2.248

2.519

.087

(7) Future Collaboration

2

3.412

1.732

.183

(8) Innovation

2

4.572

3.267

.043

Findings for Correlational Analysis
The results of correlations (see Table 7) provide initial support to the last three
hypotheses (H5a, H5b and H5c) that cooperative goals between partners lead to low
lever of opportunism(r = - 0.13) while competitive and independent goals lead to
39

high level of opportunism (r = .18, p < .05; r = .23, p < .05).

For the first four hypotheses that opportunism behaviors lead to undesirable
outcomes, opportunism is significantly negatively related to the four outcomes of
relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and innovation (r
= -.44, p < .01; r = -0.21, p<.05; r = -.49, p < .01; r = -.22, p <. 05).

Table 7 Correlations
Mean

Std. D.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(1) Coorperation

3.62

1.95

-

(2) Competition

4.27

1.79

-.81(**)

-

(3) Independence

3.73

1.77

-.57(**)

.60(**)

-

(4) Opportunism

4.00

1.24

-0.13

0.18(*)

.23 (*)

(0.86)

(5) Relationship Enhancement

4.24

1.32

.26 (*)

-.29(**)

-.21 (*)

-.44(**)

(0.83)

(6) Work Productivity

4.17

0.71

-.33(**)

.28(*)

0.20

-0.21(*)

-0.11

(0.7)

(7) Future Collaboration

4.00

1.42

.21 (*)

-.27(*)

-0.14

-.49(**)

.68 (**)

0.11

(0.91)

(8) Innovation

4.17

1.21

0.09

-0.06

0.01

-.22(*)

.45(**)

0.17

.34(**)

Notes:
a

N=86

b

Values in bracket are reliability (coefficient alpha) estimates.

c

**p<.01; *p<.05.

Structural Equation Modeling Analysis
Structural equation modeling analyses were used to explore the relationship between
goal independencies, opportunism and the outcomes of relationship enhancement,
work productivity, future collaboration and innovation. We first compared the
hypothesized model to some alternative models to see if the hypothesized model was
the best fitted one.
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(8)

(0.9)

Model Comparison
Two alternative models (M1-M2) were compared with the hypothesized fully
mediated model (the hypothesized model). Results (see Table 8) indicate that the
2

hypothesized model statistics fits the data very well. The χ of the hypothesized
model was 15.03 (d.f.=12) and NFI, NNFI and CFI were 0.95, 0.99 and 0.98,
respectively. Given the usually critical value of .90 (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980),
results of the fit statistics suggested that the hypothesized model fitted the data quite
well.
However, even if the hypothesized model fits the data well, other alternative models
are considered and compared. Specifically, the first alternative model (M1) is a direct
model with the mediator omitted. The second alternative model (M2) indicates that
opportunism impacts goal interdependence first and goal interdependence then
impact the dependent variables.

We can see that hypothesized model fit the data better after comparing the
hypothesized model to the alternative models: For the non-mediated model (M1), the
2

2

χ was 43.62 (d.f.=7). The χ for the changed-mediated model (M2) is 34.4 (d.f.=4).
The hypothesized model thus showed substantial improvement in the chi-square
indicates over the other two alternative models.

As for other model fits, CFI, NNFI and NFI for non-mediated model (M1) were 0.85,
0.86 and 0.84, respectively. Those for changed-mediated model (M2) were 0.87, 0.88
and 0.89 respectively. Overall, the fit statistics indicated that the Indirect Effects
Model M0 fitted the data best.

Table 8 Results of the Nested Model Analyses
Indirect Effects Model (M0)

Direct Effects Model (M1)

Changed-mediated
Model(M2)
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Model χ 2

Model χ 2

15.03

d.f.

d.f.

12

CFI
NFI
NNFI

0.87

NFI

0.84

NNFI

0.99

4

CFI

0.85

NFI

0.95

34.4

d.f.

7

CFI

0.98

Model χ 2

43.62

0.89

NNFI

0.86

0.88

Structural Equation Modeling Analysis for the Hypothesized Model
The path coefficients of the theorized model help to explore the findings more
specifically (Figure 2). Those findings on path coefficients generally provide good
support for this study’s hypotheses.

Figure 2 Result of SEM Analysis

Relationship
Enhancement

Cooperative
Goal

-.431**

-.084

-.125*
Competitive

.098*

Productivity

Opportunism

Goal

Work

-.579**
Future

.197*

Collaboration

Independent
-.223**

Goal

Innovation

Note:
N=86;
**p<.01; *p<.05.

Results showed that competitive and independent goals provoked opportunism
(ß=.098, p<.01; ß=.197, p<.01). However, contrary to the hypotheses, cooperative
goals did not significantly negatively

affect opportunistic behaviours (ß= -.084,
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p<ns). Consistent with the hypotheses, opportunism significantly affected the
outcomes of relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration and
innovation (ß= -.431, p<.01; ß=-.125, p<.05; ß=-.579, p<.01; ß=-.223, p<.01).
Generally, these findings on path coefficients are consistent with the correlational
findings and provide good support for the study’s hypotheses. Competitive and
independent goals between partners reduce to high level of opportunism behavior,
which do harm to their relationship and work performance. The results will be
discussed more in the later discussion part.

Illustrative Cases
Summary of the Incidents
A total of 86 cases are recorded and the interviewees’ ratings on goal
interdependencies and their descriptions on the incidents indicated that 49 cases had
largely cooperatively related goals while 32 cases reported competitive goals. In the
remaining 5 cases, interviewees reported independent goals.

Most of the interviewees who reported cooperative goals with their partners were
satisfied with the final results of the instances. All the interviewees expressed that
they were not satisfied with the results when they had competitive or independent
goals with their partners. These results were consistent with the correlational and
structural equation analyses that cooperative goals contributed to low level of
opportunism and positive outcomes while competitive and independent goals
contributed to negative outcomes.

Case Illustrations
Drawing on interviewees’ qualitative accounts of their incidents, we presented three
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cases, all of which interviewees rated either high or low in the level of opportunism.
These cases involved competitively related, independent and cooperatively related
goals, respectively, and suggested how the perceived goal interdependence affected
the partners’ opportunistic behaviour and how these leaded to different outcomes.

Case A illustrates how perceived competitive goals lead to opportunistic behaviour in
the supply chain relationship with results of unsatisfactory work performance and
worse relationship between partners. A male vice-manager in the production
department of one company reported that they recently purchased two testing
instruments from another machine supply company. In the process of using the two
instruments, they found that the outputs of one instrument are not consistent, so they
contacted the supplier and asked for an exchange or repair. In total, the manager’s
company changed the instrument for a new one twice during the one year time since
the purchasing, but the instrument was still not working well. When the interviewee
reported the problem to the supplier and requested to change the instrument the third
time, he was told that the guarantee period for the instrument was passed so that he
could not change a new instrument and the supplier company would also charge the
repairing fee if he needed the supplier company to repair the instrument. The
-manager felt very angry about this and thought as long as they have changed a new
instrument, the guarantee period should be prolonged and the supplier company
should change or repair the instrument free of charge. He thought he had a
competitive goal relationship with the supplier that the supplier’s goal was to charge
the fee of repairmen but his own goal was to get the instrument repaired or changed
free of charge. He felt that and the supplier just used the guarantee period as an
excuse not to perform its responsibility and did some unreasonable business just for
its own benefits. But at last, he had no way to ask for a free repair but paid for the
repairing fee. As for the outcomes, he reported a very negative relationship with the
supplier after this incident and felt they had low work productivity in solving this
problem. He also reported very low confidence for future collaboration with the
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supplier and low innovation.

Case B illustrates how perceived independent goals leads to opportunistic behaviour in
the supply chain relationship which then results in unsatisfactory resolution and worse
relationship between partners. A male manager in a drinking-water company
described how he ended the supply chain partnership with a customer company who
had collaborated with them for more than 3 years. The average price of the drinking
water improved a little in the market, so the manager decided to raise the price of the
water they sell. But the manager in one of the customer companies required keeping
the old price. The customer’s reason was that they had collaborated for a long time
so that his company should be treated specially. The interviewee said he believed he
and the customer had independent goals. The reason was that his goal was just to sell
all the water his company’s produces, so even the customer company did not want to
buy his water any more, he could still sell the water to other customers and keep the
price the same with the average price in the market. While the customer’s goal is to
get water with the same price, so the customer may still get water with the old price
from other water supply company even this supplier company refused to keep the
price. So under this condition, when the manager simply explained to the customer
that they could not keep price the same as before, he did not get reply from the
customer and later, the customer just ended their collaboration without any notice
beforehand. The manager felt no relationship enhancement after this incident and low
efficiency in negotiation regarding this issue. He also felt no confidence for future
collaboration with this customer and gave low rating on the improvement of
innovation.

Case C illustrates how perceived cooperative goals lead to low level of opportunistic
behaviour and enables satisfactory outcomes. The interviewee, a female manager in a
state-owned manufactory factory, described an incident some years ago. Her
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production department was short of one important material one day and without that
material, they could not produce. If they stop the production, it would cost a lot to
her company. So the interview called the supplier company of this material and asked
if they could send small quantity of this material promptly to her factory. The
supplier promised at once to send the material to the factory before dark so the
factory could continue producing. However, she failed to get the material on time
and the reason was that the deliver person from the supplier company took the wrong
address so he drove the material to another place. At first, the manager was very
anxious for the large cost of the delay and angry with the supplier. But the supplier
showed that he shared the same goal with the manager that he also hoped to deliver
the material on time and minimize the lost of her factory. So when the mistake
happened, the supplier carefully listened to problem and used the quickest way to
send the material to the right place. The supplier also admitted his fault and agreed
the interviewee’s request to lower the price of this material a little this time to make
up for some lost for the delay. And later, the supplier and the manager discussed with
each other on how to avoid the same mistake. The manager felt that their relationship
was improved after this instance and that she and the supplier were efficient in
solving this problem. She also gave high rate for innovation and future collaboration.
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Chapter VI
DISCUSSION

This chapter provides an overview of the study results and then discusses some
important findings. Specifically, the findings include issues on the influence of
opportunism on the outcomes, the relationship between opportunism and goal
interdependencies, self-interest and opportunism, and opportunism in collectivistic
cultures. Then it describes the limitations and practical implications and suggests
possibilitites for future research.

Summary of the Result
The results support the first four hypotheses about the negative effects opportunistic
behaviours between partners have on the collaboration. A low level of opportunism
is needed to help partners improve their work performance and relationship. A high
level of opportunistic behavior undermines their relationship with their partners,
lowers their work productivity and reduces the possibility for future collaboration
and innovation.

When it comes to the factors that affect the level of opportunistic behaviors, goal
interdependencies between partners are found to be most crucial. Results suggest that
reducing competitive and independent goals can help to limit opportunities. It may
also be that strengthening cooperative goals can help to reduce the likelihood of
opportunistic behavior in supply chain partnerships.

Opportunistic behaviors were found to exist between partners even in the collectivist
culture in China. Results suggest that goal interdependence theory is still useful in
studying phenomenon of organizations in collectivist countries like China.
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Important Findings
Influence of Opportunism on the Outcomes
The results suggest that opportunism ruins the partnership in the supply chain.
Specifically, it undermines partners’ relationships, lowers their work productivity
and reduces the possibility for future collaboration and innovation. As no previous
researches have ever explored how opportunistic behavior influence innovation in
supply chain, here we discuss the important finding that opportunistic behavior
undermines partners’ ability to innovate.

Innovation
Developing innovation creates competitive advantage in an organization which
helps them respond to the changes quicker and better solve problems. Continuing
innovation in the supply chain collaboration can achieve customer or supplier
satisfaction by responding to the partners’ needs promptly and adapt to the
changing marketplace (Williams, 2006). It is an important competitive advantage
for the organization in a supply chain relationship in the competing market
(Burpitt & Bigoness, 1997; West, 2002).

Results suggest that managing goal interdependencies properly could help enhance
innovation in the supply chain through the mediator of opportunism. With little
competitive and independent goals, partners would engage in few opportunistic
behaviors. Under low risk of opportunistic behaviors, organizations in supply chain can
share their knowledge and information more openly and fully. Also, a low level of
opportunism means that organizations would provide more truthful picture of their own
business and the collaboration with their partners. As a result, companies could gain
more new technologies and information from their partners. They could also help each
other gain more insight to each others’ needs and see their own shortcomings, so that
they could better improve their operations, products and services. In this way, low
opportunism helps companies to innovate thus strengthen their market competitive
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advantage. (Ansari & Modarress, 1990; Child & Yan, 2003; Frey & Schlosser, 1993;
Hardy, Phillips & Lawrence, 2003; Ireland, Hitt & Vaidyanath, 2003).

Goal Interdependencies and Opportunism
The type of goal interdependencies was found to be an important predictor of
opportunism in supply chain partnerships. Results from the correlational and structural
equation analyzes are quite consistent with the study’s model. The path coefficients
between competitive goals and opportunism and between independent goals and
opportunism are both significant. When partners thought that their goal attainments
are competitively or independently related to their partners, they were more likely to
behave opportunistically.

Besides, findings further suggest that the influence of competitive and independent
goals on opportunism may be much stronger than cooperative goals. Cooperative
goals can not ensure low level of opportunism directly, while competitive and
independent goals can significantly lead to high level of opportunism.

Although path coefficients of the model and correlational results between
cooperative goals and opportunism did not directly support the hypothesis that
cooperative goals could reduce opportunistic behavior, the path coefficients
involving perceived goal relationships should be interpreted together, because these
three types of goals are related. The assumption that goals are competitively related
or independently related implies the assumption that goals are not cooperatively
related. In this study, competitive and independent goals were positively correlated.
Both competitive goals (ß = -.098, p < .05) and independent goals (ß = -.197, p < .01)
had significant positive effects on opportunism and thus we could interpret that the
absence of cooperative goals had significant effects on opportunism.

49

The above results indicate that cooperative goals can not ensure low level of
opportunism directly, while competitive and independent goals can significantly
lead to high level of opportunism. While cooperative goals can not necessarily lead
to low levels of opportunistic behaviour, the absence of cooperative goals can
directly impact opportunism, making partners more likely to behave
opportunistically.

Self-interest and Opportunism
Transaction cost theorists suggest that self-interest pursuit is harmful and could result
in opportunism. Also, in the social relation theory, trust, ethics and people’s relation
may lead to low level of opportunism but they could all be treated as calculative
self-interests. Completely non-self-interest and trust does not exist in the partnership
between organizations. Both theories point out that partners are self-interested which
lead to opportunistic behavior. We can see that previous researches on opportunism
tended to argue that partners should be less focused on their self-interest zealously
and more on their common benefits and their relationships.

However, our study used the theory of cooperation and competition to suggest that
the opportunistic behavior was not necessarily caused by partners’ self-interests
pursuit or how much they committed on their self-interests. It was actually the
partners’ goal interdependencies that affected the level of their opportunistic
behavior. As long as the partners understand that their self-interests are little
competitive and independent related, even partners are highly committed to their
self-interests, they could still engage in low level of opportunism to seek for
positively related interests.

In other words, opportunism is not just the result of pursuit in self-interests but the
result of how self-interests and goals are related (Kale et al., 2000). The level of
opportunism depends on the extent to which the partners believe their goals are
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cooperative, competitive or independent, not on the extent of their self-interests
pursuit.

Meanwhile, the theory implied that the more committed partners are on self-interest,
the stronger effects of perceived goals towards opportunism are. When partners are
highly committed to their self-interests, they are more concerned about the outcomes
of their opportunistic behavior. Therefore, partners are less likely to engage in
opportunism if they are more self-interested, as long as they perceive that their goals
are not negatively or independently related.

Opportunism in Collectivistic Culture
In this study, the regional difference statistics did not find significant differences
between those who worked in Beijing, Nanchang or Guangzhou in the respondents’
ratings of the scales. These results might imply that in China the influence of region
and culture on people’s opportunistic behavior and perceived goal interdependencies
were not direct and absolute, and that these three cities could represent mainland
China as whole in studying supply chain partnership.

Our result supports that opportunism is still a likely barrier to partnerships under
specific collectivistic culture in China where people value interpersonal relationship
highly and tend to avoid the possible behavior that may damage the relationship
(Ding, 1995; Jehn & Weldon, 1992; Kirkbride, Tang, & Westwood, 1991; Leung,
1997; Triandis, 1990; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990; Tse, Francis, & Walls,
1994). The strong relational bond can not ensure low level of or no opportunism in
the collectivistic culture. Sometimes, partners have the low level of opportunistic
behavior just because they know that the bad reputation for those behaviors would
harm their interests and they understand the value to maintain the social relation.
Otherwise, they may still be opportunistic when the potential benefit is more than the
potential lost (Nooteboom, 1996). In addition, collectivists may be exploratory and
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aggressive toward out-group members, such as those who are in another organization
(Chen et al., 2002; Triandis, 1990). Competitive and independent goals suggest that
people and their partners are more of the out-group ones than in-group members, and
once they think so, they are likely to exploit them thus conduct opportunistic
behavior (Chen et al., 2002).

In conclusion, Chinese people can still be opportunistic toward their partners in
general and the possibility of opportunistic behavior, still, depends on how they
perceive their goals with each other.

Implications
Results, if continued to be supported, have important practical implications for
developing sound supply chain partnerships, especially in China.

Current efficient and healthy partnership has a more overall and comprehensive idea.
In such a competitive marketplace, partners in supply chain face serious stress of
developing efficient and healthy relationships with each other that could improve work
productivity, reduce costs, collaborate for the long term, meet customers’ need,
innovate and so on (Harrison & St John, 1996; Kumar, 1996). Therefore, the four
outcomes, namely relationship enhancement, work productivity, future collaboration
and innovation, in this study are crucial in valuating partnerships in the supply chain.
This study provides both quantitative and qualitative evidence of the value of goal
interdependencies and their relationship with partnerships, with the predictor of
opportunism.

Results show that competitive or independent goals between partners would
encourage

partners

interdependencies

to

between

behave

opportunistically.

Thus

managing

goal

partners, especially by limiting competitive and
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independent goals, is necessary to realize a low level of opportunistic behavior which
leads to favorable outcomes. To develop effective partnership with partners, they
should first manage their goal interdependencies with their partners. To lessen
competitive and independent goals, partners could try to: get together often to develop
a common aims and values, integrate each other’s roles, conduct a common task,
develop personal relationships, or share some rewards or distributions (Hambrick,
1994; Hanlon, Meyer, & Taylor, 1994; Li, Xin, Tsui, & Hambrick, 1999; Pearce, 1997;
Tjosvold & Tjosvold, 1995). Doing these could generate more cooperative goals and
less competitive and independent goals, between partners in the supply chain.

The findings could have practical implications for companies to do business in
China.
Chinese people are regarded as collectivists and concern about their relationships
with others particularly. But we can not assure that the collectivists could always
develop good relationships between their partners in the supply chain. Collectivists
can also be exploratory and aggressive towards others which lead to ruined
partnerships.
In order to build good partnerships with Chinese partners, they should first manage
their goal interdependencies.

This study also opposes the idea in the transaction theory and social theory that the
more the partners’ pursuit self-interests, the more likely they are opportunistic and
raises a contrary argument. Self-interest does not necessarily lead to opportunism and
threaten partnerships. The level of opportunism depends on the extent to which the
partners believe their goals are cooperative, competitive or independent, not on the
extent of their self-interests pursuit. Above findings indicate that between partners in
the supply chain self-interest pursuit is not always harmful. Partners should not be
advised to avoid self-interests, but be encouraged to limit their competitive and
independent goals.
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In this study the theory of goal interdependencies and opportunism, although
developed in the West (Deutsch, 1973), is proved to be useful in understanding the
partnerships of supply chain in China. This study’s approaches of identifying three
different types of goals are found to be useful in collectivistic cultures and in
determine opportunistic behaviors. Goal interdependence theory can be used to
understand cross-organizational issues in collectivist cultures.

Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, the sample and methodology may limit the
results of this study. The relatively small sample of 86 respondents limits the
validation and generation of the findings. Although interview is a very useful method
for this study, its operation makes collecting a wide sample of data difficult. Second,
regarding internal validity, the data is self-reported and thus is subject to biases and
may not accurately or completely report the incidences. In addition, the composition
of the sample of interviewees may limit the generality of the results. In our study, we
selected data from three different cities in China to make the data more suitable to
represent the China as a whole. Third, these data are also correlational, which are not
able to provide direct evidence of causal links between of goal interdependencies,
opportunistic behaviors, and outcomes.

In addition, the study relied on Western-developed scales. Although most of the
scales used in this study have been tested in China, researchers have doubted the
viability of applying scales developed in the West to China because Chinese people’s
ideas and understandings may be different and are likely to result in different
outcomes (Helms, 1992; Hofstede, 1993). If the model in this study could be tested
in the future research in the west, it could provide more direct evidence of the
cultural equivalence of this study’s measurements of goal interdependencies,
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opportunism and four outcomes (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Developing
different sources for the scales could reduce the possibilities of errors and bias than
one-source method for the results. This study randomly selects the sample of either
customers or suppliers so that all variables could be measured by both suppliers and
customers thus improve the results.

Another limitation is that we were only able to do the interview on one part in the
supply chain partnership for his/her relation to the recalled incident. It is possible that
the other party might have different perceived goal relationships to the incident,
might have different perceptions towards the extent of opportunism, and might report
different outcomes.

Possible Future Research
During this research, I found some other studies related to this one could be valuable
to supplement and refine the current findings. These possible future researches are:

First, it would be useful to provide direct verification of the dynamics of cooperative
goals, opportunism and outcomes in supply chain partnership, with the data gathered
from both parties in the partnerships.

Second, studies combine both high and low levels of commitment to self-interest
with cooperative, competitive, and independent goals as the independent variables to
study opportunistic behavior might be a constructive way to future test our
cooperation and competition theory and to test the contrasting hypothesis in the
transaction cost theory as well.

Third, bargaining power is considered to be powerful in determining and
understanding the opportunistic behavior in the supply chain (Macneil, 1981). Future
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research could directly investigate the impact of bargaining power on perceived goals
and opportunism in supply chain partnerships.

Summary
The results support the first four hypotheses about the negative effects opportunistic
behaviours between partners have on the collaboration and two hypotheses that
competitive and independent goals led to opportunistic behaviors.

A low level of opportunism is needed to help partners improve their work
performance and relationship. At the same time, a high level of opportunistic
behavior undermines their relationship with their partners, lowers their work
productivity and reduces the possibility for future collaboration and innovation.

The influence of competitive and independent goals on opportunism may be stronger
than that of cooperative goals. While cooperative goals is not necessarily lead to low
level of opportunistic behaviour, the absence of cooperative goals can directly
influence opportunism, making partners more likely to behave opportunistically. To
build effective partnerships between partners, partners should manage their goal
interdependencies with each other by limiting competitive and independent goals.

This study also indicates that self-interest does not necessarily lead to opportunism
and threaten partners’ partnerships. The level of opportunism depends on the extent
to which the partners perceive their goals as cooperative, competitive or independent,
not on the extent of their self-interests pursuit. Results oppose the idea in the
transaction cost theory that the greater partners are committed to self-interest, the
more likely the opportunism takes place. The extent of self-interest could just
influence the impact of the effects of perceived goals.
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The study tests the generality of some theories. The theory of goal interdependencies
developed in the West (Deutsch, 1973) is proved to be useful in this study in
understanding the partnerships of supply chain in collectivistic culture of China. Goal
interdependence theory can be used for understanding between-organizational issues
in nonwestern cultures.
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APPENDIX I
Questionnaire

Contact: Wu Lanjun, Julie
Management Department

Tel.: 2616-8308 Email: l3wu@ln.edu.hk

Supply Chain Partnership Study
Interviewee: _______________________
Your Position: _______________________
Years at Organization: _________________
Gender ______

Age ______

Education Level ______

A. We are studying how suppliers, manufacturers, and marketing organizations
work together on projects that could influent their partnership. Specifically, we
want you to discuss a concrete example when you interacted with a person (s)
from someone in another organization in your supply chain as you disagree with
each other regarding an issue or in some way tried to negotiate in terms of your
collaboration. The example can be one which the interaction with the person
from the other company turned out to be successful or one that was less
successful. (Rephrase if necessary)

Describe what led to the situation, with whom you were working, what happened,
with whom did you discuss the problem, and people reacted. (Record Verbatim)

B. Scales
Goal Interdependence
(1) What were your objectives in this interaction?
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(Record Verbatim)

(2) What were the objectives of the other person in this interaction?
(Record Verbatim)

1. In your mind, how related was your reaching your objectives with the other
reaching his objectives? (reverse-scored)
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A Great Deal

2. How much would your reaching your objectives help the other person(s) reach
his objectives?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A Great Deal

3. How much would your accomplishing your objectives interfere with his
objectives?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A Great Deal

Opportunism
1) Your partner provided you a completely truthful picture of his company’s
business in this interaction. (reverse-scored)
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

2) Complete honesty did not pay when dealing with your partner in this interaction.
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

3) Sometimes your partner altered the facts slightly in order to get what he need in
this interaction.
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

4) Your partner carried out his duties even if you did not check up on him in this
interaction. (reverse-scored)
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

5) Your partner had sometimes promised to do things without actually doing them
later, in this interaction.
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Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

6) Your partner seemed to feel that it is OK to do anything within his means that
would help further his firm’s interests, in this interaction.
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

Strength of Relationship
7)

How much did this interaction with the other person make you more confident
that you could work successfully with him in the future?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

8) To what extent did this interaction strengthen your relationship with the other
person?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

9) To what extent did this interaction make you more trusting of the other person?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

Work Productivity
10) How much did you and the other person make progress on the task because of
this interaction?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

11) How efficiently did you and the other person accomplish the task?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

12) How effectively did you and this person work on the task?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

Future Collaboration
13)

To what extent do you hope you can work with the other person in the future?
Little

14)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

To what extent will you try to seek opportunity to work with the other person
in the future?

Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A
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great deal

15)

To what extent would you be very pleased if the other person continued to be
you partner in the future?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

Innovation
16) How much did this interaction help you seek out information about new markets,
products, and technologies from sources outside the organization?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

17) How much did this interaction help you identify and develop skills that can
improve your ability to serve existing business needs?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

18) How much did this interaction help you identify and develop skills that can help
attract and serve new business needs?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A great deal

19) How much did this interaction help you seek out and acquire knowledge that may
be useful in satisfying needs unforeseen by the client?
Little

1

2

3

4

5

61

6

7

A great deal
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